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For schooling to play an important role in the development of human capital, the
system of education needs to provide quality education, which among other things
requires high-quality teachers. Facing fiscal constraints and growing enrolments,
school systems in developing countries often supplement their teaching staff by hiring
contract teachers. However, there is limited evidence on how the effectiveness of these
teachers compares to that of civil service teachers. We use a dataset from rural primary
schools in western China to estimate the causal effect of contract teachers on student
achievement and find that gains in student scores on standardised examinations in
mathematics and Chinese are less in classes taught by contract teachers than in classes
taught by civil service teachers. The results demonstrate that China’s education system
needs to focus on producing high-quality teachers to improve the quality of schooling
in its rural education system. The findings imply that educators in developing
countries should not only seek to hire increasingly more civil service teachers in rural
schools, but they should also identify ways of improving the quality of contract
teachers. If efforts to improve teaching can succeed, rural students can learn more,
earn higher incomes and contribute more to the productivity of the overall economy.
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1. Introduction
Education is widely considered to be the most important form of human
capital (Schultz 1961). In low-income and middle-income countries, the
private and social rate of return – especially to primary and secondary
schooling – is generally high (Psacharopoulos 1994). Huffman (1974) shows
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how the impact of education on income also holds in the case of agricultural 
producers. High levels of education can help producers in planning, 
production and management, and marketing phases of their family farms. 
There are also reasons to believe education aids households as they begin to 
diversify in off-farm labour markets and self-employed non-farm enterprises. 
Of course, to achieve high ultimate outcomes from education, schooling 
needs to lead to learning. Unfortunately, even though most of the previous 
literature focused on quantity (since there is plenty of census and survey data 
on years of schooling), there is very little evidence on the impact of the quality 
of schooling, particularly in rural areas.
In China, the empirical literature demonstrates the importance of 
education in raising the incomes of farm families. Lin (1991) finds that 
education enhances the production and efficiency of farmers when they are 
adopting new technologies, in this case hybrid rice. Yang (1997) empirically 
ties higher levels of schooling to producer performance. Zhang et al. (2002) 
report the high rates of return for China’s farm families as they move into the 
nonfarm sectors. Interestingly, however, in the Zhang et al. (2002) paper, a 
review of the literature demonstrates that not all studies of education and 
rates of return in rural China have found high returns, suggesting that there 
may be heterogeneity across space for subpopulations.
What may cause differences in rates of return? One frequently unstated 
assumption of the education and rural growth literature is that for schooling 
to play an important role, the system of education needs to provide quality 
education, which among other things requires high-quality teachers. Unfor-
tunately, across China, there are dramatic differences in the quality of 
teachers and their effectiveness (Peng et al. 2006, 2014). There are also 
differences in observed learning outcomes that have been thought to exist due 
to differences in teaching (Wang et al. 2017).
While there may be different reasons for the heterogeneity of teaching 
quality across rural China (and in developing countries, in general), staffing 
remote schools with effective teachers can be a challenge. Qualified teachers 
are often unwilling to work in remote locations, and local governments often 
lack the fiscal resources needed to pay higher teacher salaries (Pandey 2006). 
As a result, there can be substantial inequality in the distribution of teacher 
quality between urban and remote rural areas (Luschei and Carnoy 2010; 
Luschei 2011). Teacher quality is widely regarded as one of the most 
important inputs – if not the most important input – for student achievement 
and has even been shown to have substantial effects on outcomes later in life 
(Rockoff 2004; Rivkin et al. 2005; Leigh 2010; Chetty et al. 2011). Shortages 
of effective teachers in poor, rural areas may therefore have important 
implications for both efficiency and equity.
One of the main approaches to address teacher shortages in remote areas is 
to staff remote schools with ‘contract teachers’, also referred to as ‘para-
teachers’. Contract teachers are teachers employed on fixed-term contracts 
and often sourced from the local community. Contract teachers generally
have lower levels of education and less (if any) formal pedagogical training.
Contract teachers are typically paid lower salaries than civil service teachers
from the formal education system (Pandey 2006).
The objective of this study was to evaluate the effects of using contract
teachers to address staffing needs on student achievement. We use a primary
dataset from poor regions of western China. This region provides a unique
opportunity to study these policies, as both types of teachers are common.As in
many other developing countries, contract teachers are thought to have played
a fundamental role in expanding access to primary education in China (Sargent
andHannum2005; Robinson andYi 2008). In 1980, contract teachersmade up
half of the primary and secondary education teaching force in China (Kingdon
et al. 2013).While the use of contract teachers has fallen, they are still prevalent
in poor and remote rural areas where fiscal and logistical constraints persist.
According to data from the three western provinces of our study, contract
teachers currently make up 9 per cent of the teaching force.
The impact of contract teachers on student achievement is unclear. Existing
studies in developing countries outside of China have suggested that – despite
fewer formal qualifications – contract teachers actually outperform civil
service teachers (for a review, see Kingdon et al. 2013). This result has been
attributed to contract teachers facing stronger incentives than civil service
teachers (Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2013). For example, while firing
regular teachers may be untenable (e.g. for political reasons), schools may be
able to more easily replace poorly performing contract teachers employed on
fixed terms. It has also been argued that contract teachers may be more
effective given reduced social distance with students (Muralidharan and
Sundararaman 2013). Similar arrangements have been put forward with
regard to the medical profession by Xue et al. (2017). Convincing evidence on
the comparative effectiveness of contract teachers from existing studies,
however, primarily comes from studies on less developed areas (mostly
regions in India) and results are likely to be highly dependent on context
(Kingdon et al. 2013). In particular, formal qualifications may be more
important for student outcomes beyond a basic level of achievement. In
contrast, in more developed educational systems, the performance of civil
service teachers is expected to be greater further the employment of contract
teachers may have negative systemwide effects by deprofessionalising the
teaching profession (Kumar et al. 2001; Govmda and Josephine 2005).
In this study, we estimate the effects of contract teachers (versus civil
service teachers) on student achievement using a primary dataset collected
from 300 schools located in poor regions of western China. However, direct
comparisons of student achievement with respect to the use of contract
teachers will be biased due to across and within-school sorting of teachers and
students. The most obvious source of bias is that more fiscally constrained
and remote school systems are more likely to face teacher shortages and also
more likely to have students of comparatively lower socio-economic status.
To address potential bias, we use a value-added, cross-subject, class fixed
effect approach. Because classes are fixed across subjects in Chinese primary
schools (or, in other words, a student takes all of his or her subjects together
with the same group of peers), we are able to control for fixed class-level
characteristics (including class composition) that could bias comparisons
using variation between mathematics and Chinese teachers teaching the same
students. In using this approach, we follow several recent studies of teacher
characteristics in the fields of education and economics (Clotfelter et al. 2007;
Goldhaber et al. 2013).
We begin by estimating the effect of contract teachers on student
achievement. We present both ‘as-is’ estimates that include the effects of
teacher characteristics correlated with contract status as well as estimates
controlling for other teacher characteristics. We find that contract teachers
have a negative effect on gains in student performance on standardised
examinations in mathematics and Chinese relative to civil service teachers.
Although na€ıve comparisons of students taught by contract and civil service
teachers show only minor differences in achievement, cross-subject, class fixed
effect estimates show that examination scores of students taught by contract
teachers improve 0.13 standard deviations less than students taught by civil
service teachers. This difference is not significantly affected when controlling
for observable differences in teacher characteristics, suggesting that this
negative effect is mainly driven by either unobserved characteristics or the
contract itself.
Our study contributes to a growing literature on the use of contract
teachers in developing countries. Although there have been a small number of
experimental studies that compare contract and regular teachers directly, the
results have been mixed.1 A number of studies in the developing world have
shown mixed or negative associations with the employment of contract
teachers (Vegas and De Laat 2003; Bourdon et al. 2010). Other experimental
and observational studies suggest that the students of contract teachers
actually perform better than the students of regular teachers (Duflo et al.
2009; Atherton and Kingdon 2010). These differences may be attributable to
differences in institutional context that affect the quality of contract teachers
selected and the effort that contract teachers make once they are employed.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section provides
background on the employment of contract teachers in China. Section 3
describes our data (including survey design and characteristics of teachers,
students and schools). Section 4 discusses the empirical approaches we use to
derive the estimates of the effect of contract teachers on student performance.
We present our primary results in Section 5 and Section 6 discusses policy
implications and concludes.
1 Following the literature, we use regular teachers and civil service teachers interchangeably
in the rest of the paper.
2. Background: contract teachers and teacher deployment in rural China
The employment of contract teachers has a long history in China. The present
model of employing contract teachers (called daike in China) has its roots in
the minban system, first inaugurated in the mid-1940s as a way to expand
educational opportunity in poor rural areas at a relatively low cost (Robinson
and Yi 2008). The minban system involved the creation of schools – separate
from the regular government-administered schools – that were administered
and financed by local communities and employed contract teachers. These
teachers were mostly community members with above-average education but
no formal professional qualifications. Although the minban system was
gradually phased out, the practice of employing contract teachers persisted as
regular, government-run schools – particularly those in resource-constrained
and remote areas – struggled to recruit and retain good teachers. In 1980,
nearly half of all teachers in primary and secondary schools were contract
teachers (Fyfe 2007). Over the past several decades, the employment of large
numbers of contract teachers is believed to have contributed significantly to
China’s impressive improvement in rural student access to education
(Duthilleul 2006; Fyfe 2007).
One primary reason for the employment of contract teachers is their
relatively low cost. In a survey of Gansu Province, average contract teacher
salaries were found to be just one-fifth of civil service teacher salaries
(Robinson andYi 2008). Civil service teachers generally receive incomes above
the rural average, as well as employee benefits and relative job security (Han
2013). Contract teachers, on the other hand, work on fixed-term contracts for
lower salaries and, no benefits. In spite of their lower status and pay, most
contract teachers carry work a full teaching load for many years (Robinson
and Yi 2008). Hiring contract teachers can be an attractive choice for schools
looking to expand offerings or bring down class sizes at minimal cost.
However, as the country’s education system has developed, the practice of
employing contract teachers has come into question. The majority of full-time
civil service teachers in China graduated from upper secondary schools and
their employment is contingent upon obtaining proper teacher qualifications
and pedagogical training (Sargent and Hannum 2005; Robinson and Yi 2008).
By contrast, most contract teachers have either junior high school or upper
secondary education at most and very few have been exposed to any sort of
formal teacher training (Sargent and Hannum 2005).
Because contract teachers are less educated and less qualified on average
than civil service teachers, policymakers fear they may also be less effective
teachers. In an effort to respond to these concerns, the practice of employing
contract teachers has declined dramatically nationwide. The proportion of
civil service teachers in primary and secondary schools has expanded rapidly,
increasing by 37 per cent among primary teachers and 63 per cent among
secondary teachers from 1985 to 2002 (Robinson and Yi 2008). Some
contract teachers have been converted to civil service teacher status and
others dismissed. According to the Education Statistics Yearbook of China,
the share of contract teachers in China’s rural primary schools declined from
13.7 per cent in 1999 to 4.4 per cent in 2010 (Figure 1).
Although the employment of contract teachers is declining in rural China
on average – and is very low in terms of national averages – the practice is still
persistent in certain areas. Figure 2 presents the percentage of contract
teachers in rural primary schools in each province from 1999 to 2010. The
proportion of contract teachers remains high in poorer provinces concen-
trated in western China. In our three sample provinces, Shaanxi, Gansu and
Qinghai, the proportion of contract teachers as of 2010 is 3.2 per cent, 10.2
per cent and 14.1 per cent, respectively. Gansu and Qinghai were the two
provinces with the largest proportion of contract teachers in rural primary
schools in 2010.
Contract teachers in our sample are concentrated in resource constrained
areas. Figure 3 plots the share of teachers that are contract teachers in each
school (on the Y-axis) against a measure of the teaching capacity of the school
(on the X-axis). In this graph, the authors measure teaching capacity by
dividing the total number of students in the school by the total number of
fully funded civil service teaching positions (in Chinese, bianzhi) in each
school. According to this definition of teaching capacity, the weaker the
teaching capacity, the higher the number. Given this, we believe that schools
that are fiscally constrained will have lower teaching capacity (and higher
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Figure 1 Per cent of contract teachers in China’s rural primary schools: 1999–2010. Source:
China Education Statistics Yearbook, various years.
schools with the greatest proportion of contract teachers are in counties with
lower teaching capacity.
Although contract teachers are being phased out due to quality concerns,
there is no empirical evidence of whether China’s contract teachers in fact




The data used in this study come froma survey of 300 schools in three provinces
ofwesternChina (Shaanxi,Gansu andQinghai) during the 2011/2012academic
year. Schools were sampled as follows. We first obtained a list of all schools in
five prefectures (shown in Figure 4 –Haidong, Longan, Dingxi, Tianshui and
Ankang) which were located in counties outside of the region’s urban district.2
















































































































































Figure 2 Proportion of contract teachers in rural primary schools by province in 2010. Source:
Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China, 2010.\
2 Prefectures are the administrative regions below the province. Prefectures comprise several
counties including one county-level ‘urban district’, the main metropolitan area. The next level
below counties is that of township. School districts are generally administered at the township
level and are in turn administered by county-level departments of education.
3 The 26 counties that were included in the sample were randomly selected from a list of all
counties in the prefecture. Although we do not include a map in the manuscript that shows the
location of the counties, if we did, it would show counties that are more or less randomly
spread across the five prefectures. County maps are available upon request from the authors.
counties, 300 townships were selected from a list of all 512 townships.4 One
school was selected from all schools in each township with at least 150 students
in the school (a criterion that was chosen in order to avoid choosing (small)
schools that were destined to be closed as part of the nation’s school merger
program).
Within each school, we collected information on grade 4 and grade 5
students and their teachers. Within each study school, we randomly sampled
50 grade 4 and grade 5 students. When there were fewer than 50 students in
the two grades, all students were included. The final sample used for analysis
covers 11,698 students for whom no necessary data were missing. Given that
the rate of missing data is low (only 9 per cent), we expect that results should
not be affected. The main results are unaffected if we use multiple imputation
to address missing observations rather than dropping them.
A survey questionnaire administered to students at the beginning of the
school year (September) collected detailed information on students and their
families. The surveys included questions on ethnicity, age, gender, boarding
status, parental schooling, parental migrant status and household assets. A
separate teacher questionnaire collected information on teachers including
education, teaching experience, employment status, contract status (contract





























10 20 30 40 50 60
Teaching Capacity
Figure 3 Teacher shortage and proportion of contract teachers. Source: Authors’ survey in 300
schools.
4 As explained, in total there were 512 townships in the 26 sample counties. We included
(from our power calculations) 300 of the 512 townships in our sample. To go from 512 to 300, 
we used a set of decision criteria that had three parts: (i) we did not choose the 26 towns that 
were co-located with the county seat (which eliminated 26 towns); (ii) we eliminated towns that 
did not have any schools that had more than 150 students (which eliminated around 50 towns);
(iii) of the remaining 436 schools (512-26-50), we randomly selected 300 of them.
motivation and time use.At the endof the school year (May), both students and
teachers were surveyed a second time. This second survey collected additional
information on teacher time use and teaching practices during the school year.
In addition to surveys, all students were administered standardised
examinations in mathematics or Chinese based on the national uniform
curriculum. All students took the examinations twice, once at the beginning
of the academic year and once at the end of the academic year. Within each
classroom, half of the students were randomly assigned to take the
mathematics examination and the rest took Chinese. The examination at
the beginning of the year covered material that, according to the national
curriculum, should have covered in the school by the end of the previous year
and so it provides a baseline for the knowledge the students have. The
examination at the end of the year covered material that should have been
taught that year, according to the curriculum. Thus, a within-student
comparison of scores on the two examinations provides a measure of their
learning growth. To ensure coherence with the national curriculum, the tests
were developed with assistance from local bureaus of education. Questions
used in the mathematics examination were drawn from the question bank of
the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study, an international
assessment of mathematics and science knowledge of primary and lower
secondary school students. Questions used in the Chinese examination were
taken from national fourth- or fifth-grade textbooks. To minimise cheating,
Figure 4 Survey regions.
two versions of each examination (with re-ordered questions) were randomly
assigned to students. Students were given 30 minutes to complete the
examinations, which were proctored closely by enumerators. For analysis,
scores for both subject tests were normalised by the distribution of scores in
each grade. A full list of variables used in the analysis along with descriptions
is given in Table 1.
3.2 Characteristics of contract and civil service teachers
Panel A of Table 2 contains a listing of the number of teachers (total;
mathematics andChinese language) in each of the prefectures. This table shows
that, while the number of contract teachers varies by prefecture, there are still
substantial numbers of them in every sample prefecture. Panel B of Table 2
shows the percentage of contract teachers among teachers in our survey. The
first column shows the percentage among all teachers (including teachers who
teach neither mathematics nor Chinese). Among 819 teachers total, 72 (8.8 per
cent) are contract teachers (Row 6). The percentage of contract teachers among
Chinese teachers (9.8 per cent) is slightly higher than among mathematics
teachers (7.4 per cent), though this difference is not statistically significant (P-
value = 0.23). Rows 1–5 in the table show that there is substantial variation
across the five sample prefectures. In particular, the percentage of contract
teachers is lower in Shaanxi compared with less densely populated prefectures
in Gansu and Qinghai. The proportion of contract teachers in our sample is
consistent with official province-level statistical data (Figure 2).
Table 3 compares the characteristics of contract teachers and civil service
teachers in the sample. Columns 1–4 compare contract and civil service
teachers in the full sample.5 Compared with civil service teachers, contract
teachers are significantly less educated. Only 69 per cent of contract teachers
finished college, as compared to 83 per cent of civil service teachers. The
disparity is even larger in terms of normal school (teaching college)
attendance. Only 57 per cent of contract teachers attended normal school,
as compared to 81 per cent of civil service teachers. Finally, contract teachers
are also paid significantly lower salaries than civil service teachers. The
average monthly base salary of contract teachers in our sample is 1030 yuan,
as compared with 1610 yuan for civil service teachers. These disparities in
education and pay are entirely in line with what is commonly known about
contract teachers (Pandey 2006).
The primary analysis in this study is based on comparisons across teachers
teaching the same class. Thus, the ‘effective sample’ used to estimate effects is
comprised of students in classes where the characteristics of interest differ
between mathematics and Chinese teachers. The final two columns (Columns
5 and 6) in Table 3 test differences between contract and civil service teachers
teaching the same class. These comparisons show that the magnitudes of
5 P-values in this and subsequent tables account for clustering at the school level.




Normalised score on standardised examinations in
mathematics and Chinese at the end of the school
year minus normalised test score in the beginning of
the school year. Half of students in each class took
mathematics examination at the beginning and end
of the school year and the other half took the
Chinese examinations. Examinations were designed
with assistance from local bureaus of education.
For the mathematics examination, grade-appropriate
question items were drawn from the Trends in
International Mathematics and Science Study
question bank.
Student and household characteristics
Female (0/1) Student is female
Boarding student (0/1) Student boards at school
Age (years) Student age in years
Grade Four (0/1) Student is in fourth grade
Household size Total number of individuals living in the
student’s household
Mother has lower secondary
degree or above (0/1)
Student’s mother has completed junior high
school education or above
Father has lower secondary degree
or above (0/1)
Student’s father has completed junior high
school education or above
Father at home (0/1) Father currently lives at home (has not
migrated for work)
Mother at home (0/1) Mother currently lives at home (has not
migrated for work)
Household asset index Index of household durable assets.
Constructed using first principal component of
motorbike, tractor, car, van, refrigerator, air
conditioning, computer, washing machine and
dummy variables for type of housing (cave
dwelling, packed earth house, cement house,
apartment building, other)
Teacher characteristics
Contract teacher (0/1) Teacher is employed on noncivil service
teacher contract (has daike or minban status)
Female teacher (0/1) Teacher is female
Teacher age (years) Teacher age in years
Teacher has a higher education
degree (0/1)
Teacher has completed college or above
Teacher attended normal
school (0/1)
Teacher attended normal school
Mathematics teacher (0/1) Teacher teaches mathematics. Other teachers in
sample teach Chinese
Basic salary Monthly base salary in thousand yuan
Total compensation Monthly total compensation in thousand yuan
Teacher effort
Time spent preparing lessons per
class hour (Teacher Reported)
Teacher reported hours of preparation time
per hour of instruction
Days of absence last semester
(Teacher Reported)




Working hours last week
(Teacher Reported)
Teacher reported number of hours worked
last week
Days of absence last week
(Student reported)
Days of absence last week reported by students
Number of homework assignments
last week (Student reported)
Student reported number of homework
assignments assigned per week
Number of homework assignments
graded and returned last week
(Student reported)
Student reported number of homework
assignments corrected and handed back to
students per week
Times asked questions in class last
week (Student reported)
Student reported number of times asked
question by teacher in class last week
Teacher effort index Index of teacher effort. Constructed using GLS
weighting procedure described in
Anderson (2008)
Table 2 Total number of sample teachers and per cent of sample teachers that are contract
teachers by prefecture
Prefecture Full sample Mathematics teachers Chinese teachers
Panel A. Total number of sample teachers
1. Ankang, Shaanxi 123 58 65
2. Dingxi, Gansu 217 83 134
3. Longnan, Gansu 208 86 122
4. Tianshui, Gansu 174 70 104
5. Haidong, Qinghai 97 44 53
6. Full sample 819 341 478
Panel B. Share of contract teachers
1. Ankang, Shaanxi 1.6% 1.7% 1.5%
2. Dingxi, Gansu 9.7% 6.0% 11.9%
3. Haidong, Gansu 6.2% 2.3% 9.4%
4. Longnan, Gansu 9.1% 7.1% 10.6%
5. Tianshui, Qinghai 13.8% 17.4% 11.4%
6. Full sample 8.8% 7.4% 9.8%
Source: Authors’ survey.
differences between contract and civil service teachers teaching the same class 
remain sizeable (though only base salary remains significant given the 
reduced sample).
Table 4 compares the composition of classes taught by contract teachers 
and civil service teachers. Comparisons using the full sample (Columns 1–4) 
show a number of significant differences. Contract teachers in our sample are 
significantly more likely to teach boys, older students, students with larger 
families, students with less educated parents and poorer students (Table 4, 
columns 3 and 4). Of note, however, is that the size of classes taught by 
contract and civil service teachers is similar. This might suggest that contract 
teachers are not being hired to reduce class sizes. Rather, it is possible that, in 
fact, contract teachers are being hired either in response to shortages of civil 
service teachers or in response to budgetary constraints.
Most of these differences in class composition are reduced, however, when
comparing within schools (Columns 5 and 6). This could suggest that ‘within-
school sorting’ is not much of a concern in our sample; however, there may
remain substantial sorting within schools on unobserved characteristics.
4. Empirical approach
The primary challenge for comparing the effectiveness of contract and civil
service teachers is the possibility of unobserved heterogeneity due to selection.
First, there may exist between-school sorting of contract teacher employment.
For instance, contract teachers are more likely to be employed in more remote
schools where shortages of civil service teachers are more significant. Second,
there may be within-school sorting if contract teachers are more likely to be
assigned to certain classes or subjects. To deal with this potential source of bias,
our main strategy is to employ a cross-subject class fixed effects approach.
4.1 Cross-subject class fixed effects
Cross-subject class fixed effects can mitigate bias arising from between- and
within-school sorting of teachers and students by comparing teachers who
teach the same class.6 Because we administered examinations in both












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Female teacher (0/1) 0.49 0.38 0.11 0.10 0.18 0.36
2. Teacher age (years) 34.21 36.66 2.45 0.08 4.17 0.38
3. Teacher has higher
education degree (0/1)
0.69 0.83 0.14 0.02 0.09 0.67
4. Teacher attended
normal school (0/1)
0.57 0.81 0.24 0.00 0.24 0.17
5. Mathematics teacher (0/1) 0.33 0.42 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.69
6. Basic salary (yuan) 1030 1610 580 0.00 450 0.08
7. Total compensation
(yuan)
1260 2010 750 0.00 470 0.14
8. Number of teachers 72 747 NA NA NA NA
Note: Columns 1–4 presents the characteristics of contract and civil service teachers. Columns 5 and 6
present the within classes difference between contract and civil service teachers.Source: Authors’ survey.
6 While we might like to have an alternative approach to identify the impact of contract
teachers on student value added (for robustness purposed), using a DID approach is not
appropriate since we do not have observations on students over time as they switch from a
contract teacher to a civil service teacher (or from civil service teachers to contract teachers).
We give each student two examinations; however, they are given the two examinations at the
beginning and end of the term when they have the same teacher – either a contract teacher or a
civil service teacher.
mathematics and Chinese and have information on the characteristics of both
mathematics and Chinese teachers, we can identify the effect of teacher
characteristics (including contract status) by comparing achievement gains of
the same students across teachers. Because each elementary school student in
China takes all of his or her subjects together with a fixed group of peers (or,
in other words, with the same class), including class fixed effects in the model
allows us to control for unobservable characteristics of students (such as
ability or motivation) that could be correlated with teacher contract status.
We estimate a linearised specification of the educational production
function as follows:
DScoreis ¼ b0 þ b1CTis þ b2Tis þ b3Iis þ b4His þ cs þ eis; ð1Þ












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Class size (self-reported
by teachers)
36.99 37.45 0.46 0.80 1.17 0.20
Class size (the number
of students who have
test scores in a class)
28.99 27.37 1.62 0.42 0.08 0.95
Student characteristics
2. Female (0/1) 0.47 0.52 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.11
3. Minority (0/1) 0.09 0.11 0.02 0.51 0.00 0.46
4. Age (years) 10.87 10.62 0.25 0.00 0.04 0.73
5. Boarding student (0/1) 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.74 0.00 0.74
6. Grade four (0/1) 0.42 0.48 0.06 0.34 0.08 0.40
Student Household
characteristics
7. Household size 5.56 5.29 0.28 0.00 0.04 0.61
8. Mother has lower
secondary degree or
above (0/1)
0.40 0.47 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.17
9. Father has lower
secondary degree or
above (0/1)
0.18 0.28 0.11 0.00 0.03 0.05
10. Father at home (0/1) 0.57 0.58 0.01 0.70 0.00 0.89
11. Mother at home (0/1) 0.65 0.68 0.03 0.19 0.01 0.58
12. Household asset index 0.28 0.02 0.31 0.00 0.03 0.56
13. Total number of
teachers
72 747 NA NA NA NA
14. Total number
of students
1136 11,698 NA NA NA NA
Note: This table presents the characteristics of students and their household by teacher contract
status.Source: Authors’ survey.
where DScoreis is the value-added test scores of student i in school s (that is 
normalised test score in the beginning of the academic year minus normalised
test score in the end of the academic year); CTis is a dummy that equals one if
the teacher is a contract teacher; Tis is a vector of teacher characteristics (age,
gender, a dummy variable indicating whether teacher has a college degree, a
dummy variable indicating whether teacher attended normal school and
subject taught); Iis and His are vectors of individual student (age, gender,
boarding status and minority dummy) and household variables (household
size, father’s education, mother’s education, whether father lives at home or
not, whether mother lives at home or not, and household assets), respectively.
cs is class fixed effect. eis is an error term. The error term is allowed to be
correlated at the school level to account for clustering effects. Because students
in each elementary school class are taught all subjects together in China,
including class fixed effects (cs) in the model allows us to control for all
unobservable characteristics of the classroom/school that do not vary by
teacher – for example classroom size; the quality of the classroom facilities; the
number of other subjects that students have). The coefficient (b1) on the
contract teacher variable (CTis), then, is the effect of having a contract teacher
(e.g. differences in innate ability; gender; age – all of those things that are
potentially different between contract teachers and civil service teachers,
which are NOT in the model explicitly) and NOT the effect of the other
teacher characteristics (Tis) that were explicitly included in the model (such as
the effect of differences in formal education and the effect of salary
differences).
We also run a number of other models with/without teacher and student-
level controls. In the regression that excludes other teacher controls (besides
contract status) that estimated effect of contract teachers includes effects due
to differing characteristics of contract and civil service teachers. Student-level
controls – while not strictly necessary for identification because students
remain constant across contract and civil service teachers – are included to
improve the precision of the estimates.
One of the most important regressions is as follows:
DScoreis ¼ b0 þ b01CTis þ cs þ eis: ð2Þ
In this case (Eqn 2), the coefficient (b01), which we can call the unadjusted
model with class fixed effects model, measures all of the differences between
contract teachers and civil service teachers, including education differences
and the impact of salary differences. The difference with the full model is that
the resulting coefficient (b01) contains all of the differences between contract
teachers and civil service teachers.
An assumption underlying the validity of the class fixed effects approach is
that the differences in student achievement gains across subjects (i.e. the
difference in student gains in mathematics versus Chinese) would have been
the same if teachers of both subjects were civil service teachers or both were
contract teachers. In other words, the contract status of the mathematics
(Chinese) teacher should not influence the achievement of students in Chinese
(mathematics). A potential threat to this assumption is if contract teachers 
somehow influence the scores of students in subjects that they do not teach.
We present a limited test of this assumption in Table S1. Using only the 
sample of student scores from classes that were taught by civil service 
teachers, we regress student value-added scores on the fraction of contract 
teachers employed in the school (with and without controlling for other 
characteristics). We find that, after controlling for county fixed effects, the 
proportion of contract teachers in the school is not a significant predictor of 
student performance in subjects taught by civil service teachers.
5. Results
5.1 Teacher contract status and student achievement
The regression results using model (1) are reported in Table 5. When 
controlling for just contract teacher (column 1); contract teacher and 
teacher characteristics (column 2); contract teacher, teacher characteristics 
and student characteristics (column 3); and contract teacher, teacher 
characteristics, student characteristics and school fixed effects (column 4), 
the effect of contract teacher on student achievement suggests that contract 
teachers have a modestly negative effect on student achievement gains 
(between 0.05 and 0.06). The results are significant at the 10 per cent 
level.
Columns 5–8 present the result with class fixed effects, alone (with no other 
controls) and with different sets of teacher and student characteristics. As 
seen in column 8, the coefficient is 0.13 and is statistically significant. This 
means that holding Tis constant, the value added of the (randomly assigned 
half of the) students that had a contract teacher was 0.13 standard deviations 
less than the (randomly assigned other half of the) students that had a civil 
service teacher. Interestingly, the coefficients (b2) on the contract teacher 
variables (CTis) are insignificant. This suggests that differences in the value 
added of the students of contract teachers when comparing their value added 
of the students of civil service students are not those observable factors (CTis) 
but rather unmeasured/unobservable differences that exist between contract 
teachers and civil service teachers.
When controlling for all of the unobservable traits of contract and civil 
service teachers, the coefficient on the contract teacher suggests that the 
value-added test scores (as measured by changes of test scores) of students 
taught by contract teachers is less (from 0.13 to 0.14 standard deviations 
lower) than those of students taught by civil service teachers (columns 1–4). 
The results are more statistically significant – significantly different than zero 
at the 1 per cent level. However, since the coefficient contains the additional 
factors that were included in the full model – but had no effect – it is not 
surprising that the absolute value of the unadjusted coefficient is nearly the 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Interestingly, we can also see from the class fixed effect estimates in
columns 5–8 that none of the observable teacher characteristics are significant
in determining student value added. These findings are in line with other
recent research showing that observable teacher attributes have limited
impacts on student achievement (Aaronson et al. 2003; Ballou et al. 2004;
Nye et al. 2004; Rockoff 2004; Hanushek et al. 2005; Rivkin et al. 2005).
5.2 Teacher effort
So what may account for the results? The effectiveness of contract and civil
service teachers as measured by the class fixed effects models may differ for
two primary (unmeasured) reasons. First, it also might be because of
difference in effort between contract and civil service teachers. According to
Han (2013), contract teachers have less job security and are more closely
monitored, it would be expected that this unobserved characteristic would
lead to higher scores of the students that are taught by contract teachers.
Second, Sargent and Hannum (2005) and Pandey (2006) and our analysis
(Table 3) show that contract teachers have a lower ability than civil service
teachers. Lower ability contract teachers, ceteris paribus, would be expected
to produce student outcomes that were lower than higher ability civil service
teachers. There are many factors that would affect the ability of a teacher,
some of them are measurable – like educational level, training experiences,
etc. – and many others that do not have explicit continuous measures (e.g.
interest in teaching; commitment to teaching; understanding of the theory of
teaching). In our analysis, we have included all explicit measures in the
regression; however, most cannot be explicitly measured and so the difference
between contract teachers and civil service teachers will be a combination of
all of these factors. Since in our results in Table 5, we see that the
achievement of students of contract teachers is lower than those of civil
service teachers, and it appears that the ability effect (which would mean
higher achievement scores for the students of civil service teachers) is stronger
than the effort effect (which would mean higher achievement scores for the
students of contract teachers).
It is important to note that our model assumes that ability is a broad and
multifaceted concept that cannot be simply measured by a single variable.
Although teacher education – which we include in our adjusted model
(‘teacher has a higher education degree’) – is commonly associated with
ability, we assume that many other unobservable factors also account for
teacher ability. Indeed, the seminal work of Angrist and Krueger (1991, 1992,
1995) showed that ability encompasses far more than simply education.
Therefore, the coefficient on the contract teacher variable in our unadjusted
model measures all of the differences between contract and civil service
teachers (or everything besides those already measured – like education – in
our adjusted model). Among these differences, we believe that unobservable






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6 shows estimates of the effect of teacher contract status on
indicators of teacher effort. Regressions in this table use the class fixed effects
specification in Equation (1), but with all variables aggregated to the teacher
level (in columns 1–4). We test effects on six different indicators: the ratio of
preparation time to class time over the past week (teacher reported – Column
1); days of absence in the last month (teacher reported – Column 2); total
hours worked in the past week (teacher reported – Column 3); time spent on
asking questions in class last week (teacher reported – column 4); times
assigned homework was corrected and returned to students (student reported
– Column 5); and how often students report being asked questions in class in
past week (student reported – Column 6).
Across these six indicators in Table 6 (columns 1–6), we find no significant
effects of contract teacher status. Although point estimates for several of the
variables suggest that the effort of contract teachers is higher than that of civil
service teachers, none of the estimates are significant at conventional levels.
These results suggest that the reason that we find contract teachers
performing worse than civil service teachers in student outcomes is purely
due to lower abilities of contract teachers. In other words, the insignificant
results in Table 6 mean that there are not large (statistically significant)
offsetting positive effects coming about due to any greater effort of contract
teachers. It also means that the coefficients in Table 5 are mostly (all) due to
the inferior ability of contract teachers relative to civil service teachers.
6. Conclusion
We draw on longitudinal data from a survey of 300 schools in Shaanxi, Gansu
and Qinghai provinces to estimate the effect of teacher designation as a
contract teacher (a teacher employed on fixed-term contracts) versus a civil
service teacher on gains in student achievement over 1 year. We find that gains
in student scores on standardised examinations in mathematics and Chinese
are 0.13 standard deviations less in classes taught by contract teachers than in
classes taught by civil service teachers. The differences in student learning do
not seem to come from different effort levels between contract teachers and
civil service teachers. The difference is more likely due to the fact that contract
teachers on average have lower abilities or qualifications than civil service
teachers.
Our research has important implications for policymakers in China. On the
national level, China should continue the effort to eliminate the contract
teachers system (Robinson and Yi 2008). Although contract teachers were an
effective solution to expand the access of rural students to education in the
face of limited economic resources, our results support the national policy to
phase out contract teachers and provide them the appropriate training to
transit to civil service teachers. In the long-run, scholars also suggest that
large numbers of under-qualified teachers with low pay and limited job
security can have deleterious effects on the schooling system (Duthilleul 2006;
Fyfe 2007). Replacement of contract teachers with civil service teachers
would require additional funding in areas with fewer economic resources.
While the focus of this paper has been on one of the problems of the way
teachers are hired and its effect on student achievement, the reader should be
reminded that there are many other initiatives that school districts might take
beyond replacing contract teachers. In particular, there may be many
interventions that education systems might make on the student side – which
might be as effective (or more effective) as (than) teacher-side policy changes.
In fact, in our own results, we show that a number of student and student
household-related characteristics (e.g. ‘minority’, ‘age’ and ‘mother has lower
secondary degree or above’) have effects on student value added. In other
words, in their efforts to raise the quality of schooling, school systems need to
focus on all different possible reforms and programs, including those that
target better teaching as well as those that prepare students better so they are
able to learn more when they are in school. In this paper, however, we focus
on the teacher-side issues and leave student-side issues for future research.
The results also have lessons for all rural economies in low-income and
middle-income countries. Regardless of whether a rural economy is domi-
nated by agricultural producers or off-farm workers, Schultz (1961) demon-
strates there are high returns for education. However, the work of Hanushek
(1986) is clear that returns only accrue to education if the schooling system is
producing learning, and learning is in no small part dependent on quality
teaching. The policy implication of this paper – whether it is an issue of
contract teacher versus civil service teachers or any other characteristic of
teaching – is that the education system must focus on finding a way to attract
and keep high-quality teachers. High-quality teachers can form the basis of a
solid schooling system and that can lead to learning and higher levels of farm
income, farm output, off-farm employment and overall economic growth.
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